![\"\"](\"http:\/\/blogs.uww.edu\/lencho\/files\/2018\/08\/redapplethumb-197x300.jpg\")
<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Lately, we have been considering different dimensions of meaning. So, for example, when we were looking at the English pronoun \u201cit\u201d in the following expression:<\/p>\n
(1) \u201cLook, I\u2019ve got an apple, and I want you to hold it\u201d<\/p>\n
We can describe its grammatical meaning as \u2018third person, singular.\u201d Another way of looking at it; whatever \u201cit\u201d is, it cannot be the speaker, or the person spoken to, and it cannot be more than one. We know, furthermore, that \u2018it\u2019 may refer to \u2018an apple\u2019 in our example sentence, it can refer to something else besides an apple (perhaps the speaker is a beautiful but troubled blonde woman and she would like you to hold her pet snake, while she inspects an apple). Finally, \u2018it\u2019 may not refer to anything at all. That is, the expression \u2018hold it\u2019 can be interpreted, under the right circumstances, as the message \u2018halt\u2019!<\/p>\n
Now I would like to dedicate this week\u2019s blog entry to an aspect of this last dimension of meaning mentioned in the paragraph above. We have called \u201cit\u201d in the expression \u201chold it\u201d (meaning \u2018halt\u2019) an expletive. In this case, \u2018it\u2019 has nothing to refer to. Note that \u201chold it\u201d in this sense cannot be paraphrased by *\u201chold your body\u201d or \u201chold your motion.\u201d We have considered that the presence of \u2018it\u2019 is mandated by the fact that \u2018hold\u2019 is a so-called transitive verb, a word that requires both a subject and an object. Hence the impossibility of (3) below in comparison with (2):<\/p>\n
(2) I want you to hold it!
\n(3) *I want you to hold!<\/p>\n
In the terminology of Heidi Harley (English Words: A Linguistic Introduction<\/em>), content listemes have an\u00a0argument structure\u00a0<\/em>as part of their meaning. That is, part of the meaning of the listeme \u201chold\u201d is that it establishes a relationship between two arguments: there must be a holder and a holdee . . . at least in the grammatical sense. (Can you tell me what term Harley would use for each of these arguments?). This is the case, even if the logic of the expression does not require them. Just as for the more contentful dimensions of words, we must also learn their argument structure, something that cannot always be predicted by semantic content. Consider the following sentences:<\/p>\n (4) Adam ate voraciously. Why is (4) a grammatical sentence of English but not (5)? Note that we cannot appeal to meaning, as these two sentences mean essentially the same thing!<\/p>\n Lexical listemes may be associated with a range of different arguments. Consider the case of \u201clike\u201d below:<\/p>\n (6) Adam likes Eve. In (6) we see that like takes a so-called simple argument\u2014a noun phrase. In (7) and (8), by contrast, like takes a propositional argument, a gerund in the case of (7) and an infinitive phrase in the case of (8). Again, to stress the distinction between structure and meaning, let\u2019s look at the superficially antonymous set of sentences below:<\/p>\n (9) Adam dislikes Eve. Note that there is no way to predict from the meaning of \u2018dislikes\u2019 that sentence (11) is ungrammatical. Its paraphrase is perfectly legal:<\/p>\n (12) Adam hates to go to school.<\/p>\n Hence we can see that argument structure is quite a separate thing from the lexical content of a listeme.<\/p>\n We have seen situations in this essay where meaning and structure clash. Harley points out, towards the end of our reading for this week, that when this happens, structure always \u2018wins.\u2019 Thus she points out that although \u2018coffee\u2019, for instance, is a mass noun (notice we quantify it with \u2018much\u2019 and not \u2018many\u2019), we may force a \u2018count\u2019 interpretation of this mass noun:<\/p>\n (13) I\u2019ve had three coffees today. (\u2018coffees\u2019 now means \u2018cups of coffee\u2019)<\/p>\n Adjectives have the structural diagnostic of permitting comparison. That is why a sentence like (14) below could be heard, even though the semantics seem to prohibit it:<\/p>\n (14) Today was the most perfect day I\u2019ve had in a long time.<\/p>\n Here\u2019s Noam Chomsky\u2019s famous sentence:<\/p>\n (15) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.<\/p>\n As a testament to the priority of structure over content, note just how well (15) works compared to the more meaningful but structurally impossible (16)<\/p>\n (16) *John sleep bed nights.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Can you think of some examples in your native language which illustrate the showdown between structure and meaning?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Lately, we have been considering different dimensions of meaning. So, for example, when we were looking at the English pronoun \u201cit\u201d in the following expression: (1) \u201cLook, I\u2019ve got an apple, and I want you to hold it\u201d We can … Continue reading
\n(5)*Adam devoured.<\/p>\n
\n(7) Adam likes going to school.
\n(8) Adam likes to go to school.<\/p>\n
\n(10) Adam dislikes going to school.
\n(11) *Adam dislikes to go to school.<\/p>\n